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 ide–sensitive factor) (33–35)o rA P 2( 36) may
be required for export of functional heteromeric
receptor complexes and/or stabilization of these
complexes at the cell surface.
Our results suggest that phosphorylation
of GluR2 Ser880 is necessary for LTD induc-
tion. In Purkinje cells transfected with GluR2
K882A, which presumably contain at least
some GluR2 K882A/GluR3 and/or GluR2
K882A/GluR4c heteromeric receptor com-
plexes, the presence of a PKC consensus site
on subunits other than GluR2 appears to be
insufficient to enable LTD. It is unknown
whether the corresponding serines on GluR3
and GluR4c are indeed phosphorylated by
PKC or if upstream sequence differences and
differential protein binding render these sub-
units incapable of supporting LTD.
Previous attempts to test the involvement
of cerebellar LTD in motor learning para-
digms have relied on drugs or genetic manip-
ulations that act early in the LTD induction
signaling cascade, either at receptors or sec-
ond messengers (1). These studies have been
limited owing to the nonspecific nature of the
manipulations (e.g., disruption of mGluR1 or
PKC function). A GluR2 K882A knock-in
mouse could provide the first strong test of
the hypothesis that cerebellar LTD is required
for certain forms of motor learning.
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The Neural Basis of Economic
Decision-Making in the
Ultimatum Game
Alan G. Sanfey,1,3* James K. Rilling,1* Jessica A. Aronson,2
Leigh E. Nystrom,1,2 Jonathan D. Cohen1,2,4
The nascent ﬁeld of neuroeconomics seeks to ground economic decision-
making in the biological substrate of the brain. We used functional magnetic
resonance imaging of Ultimatum Game players to investigate neural substrates
of cognitive and emotional processes involved in economic decision-making. In
this game, two players split a sum of money;one player proposes a division and
the other can accept or reject this. We scanned players as they responded to
fair and unfair proposals. Unfair offers elicited activity in brain areas related to
both emotion (anterior insula) and cognition (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex).
Further, signiﬁcantly heightened activity in anterior insula for rejected unfair
offers suggests an important role for emotions in decision-making.
Standard economic models of human decision-
making (such as utility theory) have typically
minimized or ignored the influence of emotions
on people’s decision-making behavior, idealiz-
ing the decision-maker as a perfectly rational
cognitive machine. However, in recent years
this assumption has been challenged by behav-
ioral economists, who have identified additional
psychological and emotional factors that influ-
ence decision-making (1, 2), and recently re-
searchers have begun using neuroimaging to
examine behavior in economic games (3). This
study applies functional neuroimaging tech-
niques to investigate the relative contributions of
cognitive and emotional processes to human
social decision-making.
The limitations of the standard economic
model are effectively illustrated by empirical
findings from a simple game known as the
Ultimatum Game. In the Ultimatum Game, two
players are given the opportunity to split a sum
of money. One player is deemed the proposer
and the other, the responder. The proposer
makes an offer as to how this money should be
split between the two. The second player (the
responder) can either accept or reject this offer.
If it is accepted, the money is split as proposed,
but if the responder rejects the offer, then neither
player receives anything. In either event, the
game is over.
The standard economic solution to the Ulti-
matum Game is for the proposer to offer the
smallest sum of money possible to the respond-
er and for the responder to accept this offer,
on the reasonable grounds that any monetary
amount is preferable to none. However, consid-
erable behavioral research in industrialized cul-
tures indicates that, irrespective of the monetary
sum, modal offers are typically around 50% of
the total amount. Low offers (around 20% of
the total) have about a 50% chance of being
rejected (4–8). This latter, quite robust, experi-
mental finding is particularly intriguing, dem-
onstrating that circumstances exist in which
people are motivated to actively turn down
monetary reward.
1Center for the Study of Brain, Mind and Behavior,
2Department of Psychology, 3Center for Health and
Well-Being, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
08544, USA. 4Department of Psychiatry, University of
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA.
*These authors contributed equally to this manu-
script.
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 Why do people do this? The game is so
simple that it is improbable that these rejec-
tions are due to a failure to understand the
rules of the game, or an inability to concep-
tualize a single-shot interaction with a part-
ner (9). On the basis of participant reports, it
appears that low offers are often rejected
after an angry reaction to an offer perceived
as unfair (10). Objecting to unfairness has
been proposed as a fundamental adaptive
mechanism by which we assert and maintain a
social reputation (11), and the negative emo-
tions provoked by unfair treatment in the Ul-
timatum Game can lead people to sacrifice
sometimes considerable financial gain in order
to punish their partner for the slight. Unfair
offers in the Ultimatum Game induce conflict
in the responder between cognitive (“accept”)
and emotional (“reject”) motives, motives that
we might expect to see represented in brain
areas implicated in cognitive and emotional
modes of thought, with additional regions pos-
sibly mediating these competing goals (12).
To shed light on the neural and psycholog-
ical processes mediating such behaviors, we
scanned 19 participants using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), each in the
role of the responder in the Ultimatum Game.
We were interested in neural and behavioral
reactions to offers which were fair (the money
is split 50:50) or unfair (the proposer offered an
unequal split to his or her advantage). In par-
ticular, we hypothesized that unfair offers
would engage neural structures involved in
both emotional and cognitive processing, and
that the magnitude of activation in these struc-
tures might explain variance in the subsequent
decision to accept or reject these offers.
Before scanning, each participant was intro-
duced to 10 people they were told would partner
with them in the games to follow. They were told
that they would play a single iteration of the
game with each partner and that their decisions
with each partner would not be revealed to the
other partners and, therefore, could not affect
subsequent offers. The participants were then
placed inside the MRI scanner and began play-
ing the Ultimatum Game with their partners via
a computer interface (Fig. 1A) (13). They com-
pleted 30 rounds in all, 10 playing the game with
a human partner (once with each of the 10
partners), 10 with a computer partner, and a
further 10 control rounds in which they simply
received money for a button press. The rounds
were presented randomly, and all involved split-
ting $10. Offers made by human partners in fact
adhered to a predetermined algorithm, which
ensured that all participants saw the same set
(and a full range) of offers (14, 15). Half of these
offers were fair, that is, a proposal to split the
$10 evenly ($5:$5), with the remaining half pro-
posing unequal splits (two offers of $9:$1, two
offers of $8:$2, and one offer of $7:$3). The 10
offers from the computer partner were identical
to those from the human partners (half fair, half
unfair). The 10 control trials were designed to
control for the response to monetary reinforce-
ment, independent of the social interaction. The
distribution of offers generally mimics the range
of offers typically made in uncontrolled ver-
sions of the game (i.e., involving freely acting
human partners).
Behavioral results were very similar to
those typically found in Ultimatum Game
experiments (Fig. 1B) (16). Participants ac-
cepted all fair offers, with decreasing accep-
tance rates as the offers became less fair.
Unfair offers of $2 and $1 made by human
partners were rejected at a significantly high-
er rate than those offers made by a computer
($9:$1 offer: 2  5.28, 1 df, P  0.02; $8:$2
offer: 2  8.77, 1 df, P  0.003), suggesting
that participants had a stronger emotional
reaction to unfair offers from humans than to
the same offers from a computer (17).
Among the areas showing greater activation
for unfair compared with fair offers from human
partners (Fig. 2, A and B; table S1) were bilateral
anterior insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
The magnitude of activation was also signifi-
cantly greater for unfair offers from human part-
ners as compared to both unfair offers from
computer partners (left insula: t  2.52, P 
0.02; right insula: t  2.2, P  0.03) and low
control offers (left insula: t  3.46, P 0.001;
right insula: t  2.83, P  0.05). This suggests
that these activations were not solely a function
of the amount of money offered to the participant
but rather were also uniquely sensitive to the
context, namely perceived unfair treatment from
another human (Fig. 2, C and D). Further, re-
gions of bilateral anterior insula demonstrated
sensitivity to the degree of unfairness of an offer,
exhibiting significantly greater activation for a
$9:$1 offer than an $8:$2 offer from a human
partner (Fig. 2E) (left insula, P  0.001; right
insula, P  0.01), in addition to the aforemen-
tioned greater activation for unfair offers than
fair ($5:$5) offers.
Activation of bilateral anterior insula to un-
fair offers from human partners is particularly
interesting in light of this region’s oft-noted
association with negative emotional states. An-
terior insula activation is consistently seen in
neuroimaging studies of pain and distress (18–
20), hunger and thirst (21, 22), and autonomic
arousal (23). This region has also been implicat-
ed in studies of emotion, in particular involve-
ment in the evaluation and representation of
specific negative emotional states (24). Chief
amongst these are anger and disgust, both of
which have been found to engage a distinct
region of the anterior insula activated by an
unfair offer in the present study (25, 26).
Though studies of disgust have largely focused
on physical sensations of taste and odor (27), it
has been suggested that emotion-based disgust
(as perhaps induced by an insultingly unfair
offer) may be conceptually similar. The recruit-
ment of similar neural structures, namely the
anterior insula, in both physical and moral dis-
gust gives some credence to this notion.
If the activation in the anterior insula is a
reflection of the responders’ negative emotional
response to an unfair offer, we might expect
activity in this region to correlate with the sub-
sequent decision to accept or reject the offer.
Because all fair offers and the vast majority of
$7:$3 offers were accepted, we focused on the
$8:$2 and $9:$1 offers from a human partner for
the analysis of whether neural activity was re-
lated to the decision made in the game. Indeed,
looking at the participant level, those partici-
Fig.1. (A) Time line for a single
round of the Ultimatum Game.
Each round lasted 36 s. Each
round began with a 12-s prep-
aration interval. The partici-
pant then saw the photograph
and name of their partner in
that trial for 6 seconds. A pic-
ture of a computer was shown
if it was a computer trial, or a
roulette wheel if it was a con-
trol trial. Next, participants
saw the offer proposed by the
partner for a further 6 s, after
which they indicated whether
they accepted or rejected the offer by pressing one of two buttons on
a button box. (B) Behavioral results from the Ultimatum Game. These
are the offer acceptance rates averaged over all trials. Each of 19
participants saw ﬁve $5:$5 offers, one $7:$3 offer, two $8:$2 offers,
and two $9:$1 offers from both human and computer partners (20
offers in total).
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 pants with stronger anterior insula activation to
unfair offers rejected a higher proportion of
these offers (right insula: correlation coefficient
r  –0.45, P  0.025, one-tailed; left insula:
r  –0.39, P  0.05, one-tailed) (Fig. 3A). Of
particular interest is whether these differences in
anterior insular activation extend to the trial
level. Looking across participants, an examina-
tion of individual trials also revealed a relation
between right anterior insular activity and the
decision to accept or reject (Fig. 3B). Activation
in this area was significantly greater in response
to unfair offers that were later rejected (P 
0.028, one-tailed). These results provide addi-
tional support for the hypothesis that neural
representations of emotional states guide human
decision-making.
In contrast to the insula, DLPFC usually has
been linked to cognitive processes such as goal
maintenance and executive control (28, 29).
Thus, the DLPFC activation we observed in
response to unfair offers may relate to the rep-
resentation and active maintenance of the cogni-
tive demands of the task, namely the goal of
accumulating as much money as possible. An
unfair offer is more difficult to accept, as indi-
cated by the higher rejection rates of these offers,
and hence higher cognitive demands may be
placed on the participant in order to overcome
the strong emotional tendency to reject the offer.
Although DLPFC activated to unfair offers, this
activation did not correlate with acceptance rates
(r  0.04, P  0.05), suggesting that activation
of this region alone is not sufficient to predict
behavior. However, motivated by the hypothesis
that this region may be competing with emotion-
al areas in influencing the decision, we examined
the balance between activation in anterior insula
and DLPFC for unfair offers. Unfair offers that
are subsequently rejected have greater anterior
insula than DLPFC activation, whereas accepted
offers exhibit greater DLPFC than anterior insula
(Fig. 3B). The contrast in activation between
these two areas is significantly different for ac-
cepted and rejected offers (P  0.033, one-
tailed), consistent with the hypothesis that com-
petition between these two regions influences
behavior. DLPFC activity remains relatively
constant across unfair offers, perhaps reflecting
the steady task representation of money maximi-
zation, with anterior insula scaling monotonical-
ly to the degree of unfairness, reflecting the
emotional response to the offer. Caution is need-
ed when comparing the magnitude of the fMRI
signal across brain regions. However, it is inter-
esting to note that the outcome of the decision
may reflect the relative engagement of these
regions, with greater anterior insula activation
biasing toward rejection and greater DLPFC bi-
asing toward acceptance. Finally, unfair offers
were also associated with increased activity in
ACC. ACC has been implicated in detection of
cognitive conflict (30, 31), and activation here
may reflect the conflict between cognitive and
emotional motivations in the Ultimatum Game.
This study sought to identify the neural cor-
relates of fairness and unfairness, and in partic-
ular the relative contributions of cognitive and
emotional processes to human decision-making.
A basic sense of fairness and unfairness is es-
sential to many aspects of societal and personal
decision-making and underlies notions as di-
verse as ethics, social policy, legal practice, and
personal morality. Our results are consistent with
Fig.2. Activation related
to the presentation of an
unfair offer. (A) Map of
the t statistic for the
contrast [unfair human
offer – fair human offer]
showing activation of bi-
lateral anterior insula and
anterior cingulate cortex.
Areas in orange showed
greater activation follow-
ing unfair as compared
with fair offers (P 
0.001). (B) Map of the t
statistic for the contrast
[unfair human offer – fair
human offer] showing
activation of right dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex.
(C) Event-related plot for
unfair and fair offers in
right anterior insula. The
offer was revealed at t 
0o nt h ex axis. (D)
Event- related plot for
unfair and fair offers in
left anterior insula. (E)
Event-related plot for
different human unfair
and fair offers in subset
of left anterior insula.
Fig.3. (A) Acceptance rates of unfair offers
plotted against right anterior insula activation
for each participant. (B) Right anterior insula
and right DLPFC activation for all unfair offer
trials, categorized by subsequent acceptance or
rejection.
R EPORTS
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 the idea that the areas of anterior insula and
DLPFC represent the twin demands of the Ulti-
matum Game task, the emotional goal of resist-
ing unfairness and the cognitive goal of accumu-
lating money, respectively. Further, our finding
that activity in a region well known for its in-
volvement in negative emotion is predictive of
subsequent behavior supports the importance of
emotional influences in human decision-making.
We believe that these findings, and work that
proceeds from them, will provide a more de-
tailed characterization of specific emotional re-
sponses, their neural substrates, and the social
circumstances under which they are elicited.
Therefore, not only do our results provide direct
empirical support for economic models that ac-
knowledge the influence of emotional factors on
decision-making behavior, but they also provide
the first step toward the development of quanti-
tative measures that may be useful in constrain-
ing the social utility function in economic mod-
els (32, 33). Models of decision-making cannot
afford to ignore emotion as a vital and dynamic
component of our decisions and choices in the
real world.
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V1 Neurons Signal Acquisition of
an Internal Representation of
Stimulus Location
Jitendra Sharma,1,2* Valentin Dragoi,1,2
Joshua B. Tenenbaum,1 Earl K. Miller,1,2,3 Mriganka Sur1,2*
Afundamentalaspectofvisuomotorbehaviorisdecidingwheretolookormove
next. Under certain conditions, the brain constructs an internal representation
of stimulus location on the basis of previous knowledge and uses it to move
the eyes or to make other movements. Neuronal responses in primary visual
cortex were modulated when such an internal representation was acquired:
Responses to a stimulus were affected progressively by sequential presentation
of the stimulus at one location but not when the location was varied randomly.
Responses of individual neurons were spatially tuned for gaze direction and
tracked the Bayesian probability of stimulus appearance. We propose that the
representation arises in a distributed cortical network and is associated with
systematic changes in response selectivity and dynamics at the earliest stages
of cortical visual processing.
To assess whether monkeys (Macaca mu-
latta) form an internal representation of stim-
ulus location, we devised a task in which
information about future stimulus locations
could be acquired progressively with succes-
sive trials in one experimental condition but
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